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Grid-based access control for Unix environments, Filesystems and
Web Sites
A. McNab
Schuster Laboratory, University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom
The EU DataGrid has deployed a grid testbed at approximately 20 sites across Europe, with several hundred
registered users. This paper describes authorisation systems produced by GridPP and currently used on the
EU DataGrid Testbed, including local Unix pool accounts and fine-grained access control with Access Control
Lists and Grid-aware filesystems, fileservers and web developement environments.
1. Introduction
The overall security infrastructure of the EU
DataGrid (EDG)[1] project has been described
elsewhere[2]. In brief, it consists of Certificate Au-
thorities (CA) granting X.509 cryptographic certifi-
cates to users and hosts, and providing authentica-
tion; and Virtual Organisations (VO) which autho-
rize users to use resources allocated to the VO. Au-
thorization information is currently published as VO
membership lists using LDAP, but VOMS, a system
based on attribute certificates has been developed and
described[2].
This paper describes ways in which this autho-
rization information is used to control access to lo-
cal resources, such as Unix accounts, disk filesystems
and the virtual filesystems exported by file and web
servers.
2. Unix Account Management
The remote job execution middleware used by EDG
is based on the Globus[3] gatekeeper, and this uses a
static mapping from grid identities, based on X.509
certificates, to local Unix user accounts. A text file
lists grid identities and corresponding local accounts
and when a job is received for execution, it is forked
as a process owned by the local Unix user account.
Whilst adaquate for small Virtual Organisations, this
procedure is insufficient for VOs with hundreds of
users at tens of sites. To address the maintainence
of the list of acceptable grid identities, EDG has de-
veloped software to allow VOs to publish membership
lists and for sites to construct the mapping text file[2].
However, this still leaves the creation and manage-
ment of the local Unix accounts themselves. To ad-
dress this for EDG, we have developed a system of dy-
namically allocated Pool Accounts[4], which are cre-
ated by the site administrator and then allocated to
users as new job or file server requests are received.
A directory of lock files is maintained to retain a one-
to-one mapping between grid identities and allocated
user accounts. This also ensures that if two requests
overlap, they are assigned to the same Unix user ac-
count, which allows sharing of files between multipart
jobs, and between jobs and fileserver requests.
Since Unix operating systems implement filesystem
permissions in terms of Unix accounts, this also pro-
vides a rudimentary way of preventing jobs from dif-
ferent grid users from interfering with each other.
Accounts may be returned to the pool of unused
accounts once all jobs running as that account have
terminated and after leaving a grace period for file
retrieval. Since the account allocation book keeping
is maintained by lock files, this is straightforward to
implement as a Unix shell script which is run peri-
odically and which can be tailored to individual site
requirements.
3. Grid Access Control Lists
To describe fine-grained access control of files and
other file-like resources, EDG has developed GACL[4],
a format for access control lists, written in XML and in
terms of grid identities or Virtual Organisation mem-
bership.
Each GACL access control list is divided into one
or more entries, each of which has a set of permissions
which are granted if that entry’s credential require-
ments are met. Permissions are to Read (to read files),
List (to obtain directory listings), Write (to create or
write to files, to create directories, or to delete files
or directories) and Admin (to modify access control
lists.)
An entry may have one or more credentials which
must be present, including X.509 certificate identi-
ties, VO groups or VOMS attribute certificates. Two
generic credentials, Authuser (any user with a valid
certificate) and Anyuser (any user irrespective of cre-
dentials), allow access to be granted to users with no
affiliation to the site.
An API and library are provided for manipulating
GACL lists, and this is the foundation of the filesys-
tem and fileserver access control described in the re-
mainder of this paper, and of the EU DataGrid Stor-
age Element described elsewhere[5].
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4. SlashGrid filesystems
We have paid particular attention to applying the
GACL access control to standard local filesystem op-
erations, using the SlashGrid[4] framework described
here.
Most applications use a filesystem interface to ac-
cess local files on the same machine. This organises
data into files, contained in a hierarchy of folders or di-
rectories, each accessible by name. For interactive use,
a graphical file browser is commonly used, displaying
files as icons which may be opened and accessed using
a mouse. File access within an applications uses an
analogous programming interface, which in most pro-
gramming languages is based on a set of functions to
‘open’, ‘read’, ‘write’ etc.
The security associated with these operations is tra-
ditionally tied to credentials which only have meaning
on the machine (or in some cases the computing site
or cluster) in question. Typically, this takes the form
of a short username or group name, and a specific file
may have one user who has permission to write to
that file. For EDG testbed sites, these are dynami-
cally allocated pool accounts, but there may be static
accounts in other parts of the system, such as user-
interface hosts.
As we connect machines and sites together with
Grid technology, these local credentials become in-
creasingly inappropriate for managing authorisation
to use resources, as they cannot readily be shared
across the Grid. For example, a user may have the
username mcnab at one site, but amcnab at another,
and at a third site user mcnab may be a completely
different individual.
Although the pool accounts system described above
automates the management of local accounts, the sys-
tem cannot readily be used when creating long lived
files, since the username they are owned by is only
temporarily associated with a specific Grid identity.
Initially to resolve this shortcoming, we have pro-
duced a file system framework, SlashGrid, which al-
lows file and directory authorisation to depend on
long-lived Grid identities. SlashGrid creates a hierar-
chy of directories under /grid where an application’s
username, whether static or temporary, is irrelevant
to whether it can create, read or modify files: what
matters are the Grid credentials the application cur-
rently holds on behalf of the user, wherever they are
on the Grid.
For interoperability with other products of the EU
DataGrid and related projects, SlashGrid uses the
GACL library and access control lists stored in per-
directory or per-file control files.
SlashGrid has also been designed to be readily ex-
tensible, by the use of third-party plugins to add addi-
tional filesystem types. In particular, we have imple-
mented an HTTP/HTTPS filesystem, in which the
contents of remote websites can be accessed by ap-
plications as if they were local files, and in the case
of HTTPS, may prove the user’s identity to remote
servers to obtain access to restricted files.
This has the potential to allow existing applications
to operate on the Grid, indifferent to the true location
of the files they manipulate, with remote Grid file ac-
cess provided as a service by the operating system
layer.
5. GridSite web and file servers
Web browsers represent the most common, famil-
iar and most widely installed application used to ac-
cess remote resources on the current Internet. How-
ever, most websites are built using HTTP technology,
which can only implement cumbersome authentica-
tion and authorisation mechanisms. Typically, this in-
volves the user choosing a short memorable password
for each site to which they need to identify themselves.
Consequently, the user may find themselves having to
enter multiple usernames and passwords as they pass
between websites run by their employer, their bank,
online merchants etc. As well as the inconvenience
involved, this is also vulnerable to “brute force” at-
tacks by third parties due to the short length of the
passwords.
Since the mid-1990’s, most web browsers have also
supported the HTTPS protocol, which uses X.509 dig-
ital certificates and has been widely used to provide
authentication of websites to users. This allows a user
to send credit card details to a merchant’s website, for
instance, with some confidence that the site is not be-
ing impersonated by a malicious third party.
Although the corresponding user authentication to
websites has been supported since the adoption of
HTTPS, it has been far less used, due to the admin-
istrative overhead and cost of verifying users’ identity
before giving them a meaningful X.509 user certificate.
However, with the large-scale deployment of X.509
certificates to members EDG and other Grid projects
across the world, this is changing, and it is now practi-
cal to base a High Energy Physics collaboration’s web-
site on HTTPS rather than HTTP technology, with-
out requiring users to install any special software.
The GridPP project, which represents the UK in-
volvement in EDG, has chosen to implement its col-
laboration website in this way, and to produce a gen-
eral website management tool, GridSite[4], which is
flexible enough for other projects to use for their own
sites.
Since GridSite is able to uniquely and securely
identify users by their X.509 certificate, they can be
granted rights to edit and upload webpages, images
and binary files. This is enforced using the GACL
access control lists described above. Access control
can be specified in terms of individuals or Virtual Or-
ganisation groups, with membership managed by the
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group’s administrators through the same web inter-
face.
This has allowed GridPP to devolve maintenance
of the website down to the level of those directly in-
volved in each area of work. Since the administration
of group authorisation is also devolved, the adminis-
trative overhead normally carried by the website man-
ager is greatly reduced.
Since GridSite permits several users to maintain a
set of documents, this has also made collaboration be-
tween GridPP members at different institutions con-
siderably easier; and tools are provided to retain old
versions and record document histories to automate
the book-keeping of who has changed a document and
at what date.
Initially, GridSite has been implemented as a self-
contained executable run from the web server to han-
dle each HTTP or HTTPS request. It has now been
divided into standalone executables to handle interac-
tive management of the site and groups by adminis-
trators, and a loadable module which is dynamically
linked directly into the Apache[6] webserver used. By
incorporating GridSite and GACL technology directly
in the webserver, all technologies support by the web-
server, including static file serving, and dynamic con-
tent provided by CGI scipts, PHP, ASP or JSP server-
parsed pages, for example, can be subject to grid-
based access control.
This flexibility allows a GridSite server to simulta-
neously operate as an efficient file server, as a web
host with dynamic content and as a grid host with
Grid Services in Java and other languages operating
in their favoured environments.
6. Future Developments
Future developments will include porting of the
SlashGrid filesystems framework and the GridSite
server management system to platforms other than
Linux. Support for additional authorization creden-
tials, such as Globus CAS, will be added to the
GACL library, along with support for access control
languages recommended by the GGF Authorization
Working Group.
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